RBM represent a compromise between participatory and representative approaches insofar the public authorities remain in control of over-all policy setting and are informed about outcomes through an audit process, while management and implementation responsibility is delegated to a user group level. The case Cabozantinib order of rock lobster management in New Zealand illustrates how both these governance rationales may be in play simultaneously. In addition, this case deploys rationales relating to market based governance. Being a pioneer of an ITQ system, New Zealand has built its fisheries management system
on a market based approach, hereby seeking to enhance the economic output of the fisheries and the cost effectiveness of the management system, while minimizing public costs [44]. As Yandle [34] draws attention to, the rock lobster case is particularly interesting because it illustrates how co-management may develop within a formalized ITQ management system. The participation of rock lobster industry organizations in management and research processes is to a large extent motivated by economic incentives. Through systematic participation Selleckchem Silmitasertib in resource planning and data collection, the industry have managed
to reduce cost while increasing the economic performance of the fisheries, which in turn is also reflected in higher values of the shares in the fishery [34]. Mayne [62] suggested that the major challenges with implementing RBM in general can be divided into organizational and technical challenges. Organizational challenges involve difficulties of getting actors interested in, and committed to, the implementation of new practices. Technical challenges in particular relate to obtaining and using relevant information
efficiently. Main issues pertaining to both kinds of challenges, as they can be expected to emerge in a fisheries governance context, will be briefly addressed. On the technical side, a well-known problem in RBM is the goal displacement that arises when operating agencies focus more on documenting measurable PAK5 outputs than on achieving overall objectives [3], [5] and [63]. This problem underlines the significance of creating incentives for operating agents to achieve overall goals, not just to deliver impressive performance statistics. This challenge relates to how management performance can be measured, allowing for an assessment of whether objectives have been achieved or not. Here, the development and selection of appropriate indicators is crucial [2], [64] and [65]. An extensive review of performance of RBM within the UN agencies suggested that over-complexity of performance management systems is an important significant threat for a successful implementation of RBM [15]: 17.